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1 Introduction
As matter of policy, capital markets in many parts of the developing world underwent
‘liberalization’ during the 1990s. The process was designed to open up those markets to both
greater flows and a wider array of capital vehicles.1 To that extent the policies succeeded, and
private capital flows to developing countries both increased and increasingly took the form of
securities such as stocks and bonds (see Tables 1 and 5). Even part of the growth in direct
foreign investment took the form of purchases of equity securities.
This transformation in developing country capital markets had the effect of broadening the
class of global investors. Whereas investors in the prior period were primarily banks (through
syndicated loans) and multinational corporations (direct investment), the securitization
brought in individual investors and professionally managed funds from institutional investors,
pension funds, insurance companies, university endowments and foundations. This
contributed to the increase in the overall flow of capital to developing countries.
These increased flows of securitized capital brought forth the new threat of their rapid
reversal, and they also introduced or increased the exposure of developing country financial
markets to greater volatility of securities prices in other developing countries as well as those
in advanced capital market countries.
Along with this transformation of capital flows to developing countries, and the associated
new market risks, came a new set of parallel financial transactions. These financial
transactions, though less well understood, are integral to modern financial markets and they
are just as important in their potential to contribute to financial sector instability. These
‘shadow’ transactions include derivatives,2 repurchase agreements and securities lending.
The term ‘shadow’ should not be interpreted to mean nefarious or devious. Rather, the term
appropriately reflects the fact that these transactions are often built upon, or  cast  like a
shadow, by the capital flows. The term shadow is also appropriate because these types of
transactions are far less transparent.
These shadow transactions often function to hedge or manage the risks associated with
capital flows. However, they also serve in some cases to facilitate unproductive activities.
The unproductive activities include the avoidance of taxation, the manipulation of accounting
and reporting rules and the outflanking of prudential regulations. When used to dodge
financial market regulations designed to add safety and soundness to the markets and assure
their transparency, then these unproductive activities are a source of market instability and a
reduction in the efficiency of market pricing. In addition, the use of derivatives, even when
they are used by foreign and domestic enterprises for hedging, can in some cases contribute
to the downward pressure on emerging market currencies as investors rush to hedge their
                                                
1 The term ‘vehicle’ is used to refer to the form in which capital is raised and traded: bank loans, bonds
(including local currency, major currency and structured notes), equities and foreign direct investment.
2 The term ‘derivative’ is used in the most generic sense to mean a contract that is used to create price
exposure by having its price derived from that of an underlying commodity, security, rate, index or event. It
also creates leverage and does not generally require the ownership of title or principle.  Examples of
derivatives are futures, options, forwards, swaps and the derivate component of hybrid instruments such as
structured notes.2
currency exposure in anticipation of a financial crisis or to meet collateral requirements once
currency and asset prices begin to fall.
Although exact figures on the magnitude of these transactions do not exist, it does not mean
that the subject is not important and that it should not be explored in order to understand how
it contributes to a financial crisis.
These new developments in financial transactions in developing countries require new
regulatory and supervisory efforts to ensure that they contribute to the growth in living
standards and do not result in less stable financial systems and greater economic
vulnerability. This paper will focus on derivatives and leave repurchase agreements and
securities lending transactions for another time.3 It will analyse policies designed to stabilize
developing country financial markets. This will include a policy analysis of financial
regulations from industrialized countries and how they might be adapted to the circumstances
in developing countries so that they might be successfully applied to reducing volatility and
mitigating the impact of financial sector disruptions on the overall economy.
2 Transforming capital flows
The traditional status of banking4 as the fount for new capital was diminished by the policies
of capital market liberalization that brought forth the emergence of modern capital markets in
developing countries. Whereas new capital was once raised solely from within the firm or
through the banking sector, the new arrangement allowed capital to be raised through the
issue of stocks and bonds.5 This securitization of new capital proved to be more efficient in
several important ways and soon surpassed the once predominant bank lending as the source
for new capital formation and sovereign borrowing.6
Banking lending was the traditional means of raising new capital. Banks mobilized savings
and collected together pools of idle liquidity in the payments and settlements system, and
turned them into loanable funds for new investments. Banks traditionally held loans on their
balance sheet as assets, and this formed the basis for forming ongoing relationships that
promoted greater information sharing and trust. Another traditional beneficial feature of bank
lending was that banks could more easily restructure the debt of a borrower because the bank
held all of the debt on its balance sheet (thus requiring no cooperation from other lenders).
Traditionally, bank profits were earned through maturity conversion. Banks accepted short-
term deposits, on which they paid short-term interest rates, and then transformed the funds
into longer-term loans on which they earned higher, long-term interest rates. These earning
                                                
3 A repo is similar to a foreign exchange swap in that it includes an obligation to first purchase (sell) and then
sell (purchase) a security at agreed-upon prices.  A securities loan is comparable but is treated as a loan on
which collateral is posted and rent is paid instead of a matching set of transactions.
4 An excellent discussion of the traditional role of the banking sector can be found in Ron Chernow (1997).
5 The term ‘bond’ will be used to mean the broad class of credit instruments which are also known as notes,
debentures and ‘paper’.
6 Another discussion of how securities markets surpassed the traditional banking business can be found in
Lowell and Farrell (1996).3
depended upon the steepness of the yield curve and how far the bank was willing and able to
move out along the curve. Banks often avoided this interest rate risk by issuing loans that
were of longer maturity but whose interest rate was frequently adjusted over the life of the
loan. This enabled banks to match the costs of their deposits to the earnings on their loans
while avoiding the market risk of interest rate fluctuations.
Traditional banking had some significant shortcomings. The loans on the portfolio were
illiquid, and banks found geographic and sector diversification of their loan portfolio
difficult. On a macroeconomic level, capital formation in the form of bank lending meant that
investment decisions were controlled by a small number of bank executives and managers
and not through the interaction of a large number of anonymous market participants as in
securities markets. Another shortcoming on the macroeconomic level was that bank loans did
not generate market prices for the investment assets – that is, there was no price discovery as
found in stock and bond markets.
Innovation and technological developments in advanced capital markets established a
precedent and helped lead to the promotion of capital market liberalization in developing
countries.
The modernization of these financial markets had a profound impact on the shape of capital
flows to the region during the 1990s. Capital flows to developing countries during the 1970s
and 1980s were primarily in the form of syndicated, variable rate, foreign bank loans. In this
way they were not very different from other developing countries. Large money-centre banks
recycled petrodollars by underwriting syndicated bank loans to developing countries that
were struggling to pay for oil imports and eager for new net capital inflows. The loans were
mostly adjustable rate and denominated in US dollars or some other major currency.7
This created a distribution of risk that was not balanced between borrower and lender. The
borrower carried both the exchange rate risk and the interest rate risk. The lender held credit
risk, but this was minimized through restricting credit to sovereign entities and through the
use of cross-default clauses.8 The lender also reduced credit risk through diversification and
the loan syndication process.
When the market went against the borrowers, their debt position deteriorated so badly that
they became unable to properly service their foreign currency bank loans. This failure was
thereby transformed into increased credit exposure to the lenders. Painful debt negotiations
followed, and they led to debt rescheduling combined with new lending. This approach had
proven to be a failure by the end of the 1980s, and a new round of debt rescheduling
commenced and this time it was combined with some debt forgiveness. In the end, both the
international lenders and the developing country borrowers suffered; in Latin America the
depressed 10 years of debt overhang beginning in 1982 has come to be called ‘the lost
decade.’
                                                
7 The term major currency refers to the US dollar, euro, yen and British pound sterling which are the industrial
country currencies most likely to be used to denominate loans and securities issued by developing countries.
8 Cross-default clauses in the loan contracts whereby a default by a borrower against any lender would be
considered a default against all lenders.4
Table 1
Private capital flows to developing countries
Percentage of total official and private flows*
Type of flow 1973–81 1990–97
Bonds 3.5 15.2
Bank Lending 63.9 11.7
Foreign direct investment 16.8 50.3
Portfolio Equity 0.3 16.4
* Note that figures are calculated as percentage of total flows and therefore private flows do not sum to 100 per
cent.
Source: World Bank (2000) Chapter 6, p.126.
Table 2





1990 1999 1990 1999
Indonesia 125 277 8,081 64,067
Korea 669 725 110,594 308,534
Malaysia 282 757 48,611 145,445
Philippines 153 226 5,927 48,105
Singapore 150 355 34,308 198,407
Thailand 214 392 23,896 58,365
Total 1,593 2,732 US$231,417 US$822,923
(+72%) (+256%)
Data source: World Bank (2001).
Capital flows began changing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Table 1 illustrates the great
transformation that occurred in the form of capital flows to developing countries. As a
percentage of total capital flows, banking lending fell from 64 per cent to 12 per cent, while
capital flows in the form of stock shares rose from 0.3 per cent to 16.4 per cent. The use of
bonds as a development finance vehicle rose from 3.5 per cent to 15 per cent over the same
period.
This not only elevated the status of the East Asian bond market, but also established their
equity markets as platforms on which to raise capital and destinations in which to locate
portfolio investments of high net wealth individuals as well as institutional investments
(Dalla and Khatkate 1996).5
Two of the key indicators of financial market deepening and sophistication is the degree of
liquidity (reflected in the trading volume) and the size of market capitalization.
Table 2 illustrates how these key indicators changed between 1990 and 1999.
Recall from Table 1, that the percentages measure the proportion of total capital flows. The sum
of the percentages equals the share of private flows. Private capital flows accounted for 84.5 per
cent of flows in the earlier period, while the capital market liberalization policies of the 1990s
resulted in 93.6 per cent of capital flows being from private sources in the later period. This is
borne out in Table 3 on the flows to developing countries during the 1990s.
The upshot of the transformation was not just greater flows and greater volatility of flows and
asset prices, it was also a redistribution of risk between investors in advanced capital markets
and capital recipients in developing countries. This more diversified flow of foreign capital
(diversified in the sense that various capital vehicles were used to channel the capital flows)
generated a different distribution of market and credit risks. Compared to the bank loans of
the 1970s and early 1980s, this more diversified flow of capital tended to distribute risk
towards investors in the advanced capital market economies. Stocks or equity shares shifted
price risk, exchange rate risk and credit risk to foreign investors. Local currency bonds
shifted price, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and credit risk to foreign investors. Even
major currency denominated bonds issued by developing country borrowers shifted interest
rate risk, as well as credit risk, to foreign investors. Direct foreign investment in physical
capital – whether equipment, plant or real estate – similarly shifted price and exchange rate
risks and credit risk to foreign investors. The combined effect was to potentially reduce the
developing economies’ exposure to the market risk.9
Table 3
Net long-term flows to developing countries
(US$ billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Official 55.9 62.3 54 53.4 45.9 53.9 31 39.9 50.6 52
Private - Total 42.6 61.6 99.8 165.8 174.5 203.3 282.1 304 267.7 238.7
    Bank loans 3.2 5 16.4 3.5 8.8 30.4 37.5 51.6 44.6 -11.4
    Bond 1.2 10.9 11.1 36.6 38.2 30.8 62.4 48.9 39.7 25
    Other debt 11.3 2.8 10.7 8.7 3.5 1 2.2 3 -3.1 5.5
    Equity-portfolio 2.8 7.6 14.1 51 35.2 36.1 49.2 30.2 15.6 27.6
    DFI 24.1 35.3 47.5 66 88.8 105 130.8 170.3 170.9 192
Total 98.5 123.9 153.8 219.2 220.4 257.2 313.1 343.9 318.3 290.7
Private (%)
    Bank loans 7.5 8.1 16.4 2.1 5.0 15.0 13.3 17.0 16.7 -4.8
    Bond 2.8 17.7 11.1 22.1 21.9 15.2 22.1 16.1 14.8 10.5
    Other debt 26.5 4.5 10.7 5.2 2.0 0.5 0.8 1.0 -1.2 2.3
    Equity-portfolio 6.6 12.3 14.1 30.8 20.2 17.8 17.4 9.9 5.8 11.6
    DFI 56.6 57.3 47.6 39.8 50.9 51.6 46.4 56.0 63.8 80.4
Data source: World Bank (2001).
                                                
9 The term ‘market risk’ refers to the set of all investment risks except credit risk and settlement risk. Market
risk includes price risk, interest rate risk, and exchange rate risk.6
3 Growth of shadow transactions
3.1 Overview
Derivatives trading grew up alongside these new forms of capital flows as part of an effort to
better manage the risks of global investing. Derivates allowed risk to be shifted away from
investors who did not want it and towards those more willing and able to bear it. At the same
time, derivatives created new risks that were potentially destabilizing for developing
economies. The following is an analysis of how derivatives played a constructive role in
channeling capital from advanced capital markets to developing economies, and how at the
same time they played a potentially destructive role in laying the foundations of the crisis.
These capital instruments and their associated risks and the associated derivatives used to
manage those risks are listed in Table 4.
Derivatives facilitated capital flows by unbundling risk and then more efficiently
redistributing the various sources of risk associated with the various capital vehicles
including bank loans, equities, bonds and direct foreign investment. Foreign currency loans
expose the foreign investor to credit risk and the domestic borrower to exchange rate risk; a
fixed interest rate loan exposes the foreign lender to interest rate risk and a variable rate loan
exposes the domestic borrower to interest rate risk; and a long-term loan exposes the foreign
lender to greater credit risk and a short-term loan exposes the domestic borrower to refunding
risk (sometimes called liquidity risk). Equities expose the foreign investor to credit risk along
with the market risk from changes in the exchange rate, market price of the stock, and the
uncertain dividend payments. Notes and bonds expose the foreign investor to credit risk and
market interest rate risk, and hard currency bonds expose the domestic borrower to exchange
rate risk. The financial innovation of introducing derivatives to capital markets allows these
traditional arrangements of risk to be redesigned so as to better meet the desired risk profiles
of the issuers and holders of these capital instruments.
While the risk shifting function of derivatives serves the useful role of hedging and thereby
facilitating capital flows, the enlarged presence of derivatives also raises concerns about the
stability of the economy as a whole. The use of derivatives can lead to lower levels of
transparency between counterparties and between regulators and market participants. They
can be used for unproductive activities such as avoiding prudential regulations, manipulating
accounting rules and credit ratings, and evading taxation. They can also be used to raise the
level of market risk exposure relative to capital in the pursuit of higher yielding – and higher
risk – investment strategies.
The greater the amount of market exposure – possibly created by open positions in
derivatives contracts – the greater will be the impact of a large change in the exchange rate or
other market price on the financial sector and economy as a whole. In this context, the use of
derivatives to reduce the amount of capital relative to risk-taking functions reduce the
effectiveness of capital to serve as a buffer against market turbulence; and as a governor on
total risk taking thus raises the likelihood of systemic failure and heightens doubts about the
stability of the financial sector and the economy as a whole.
3.2 Analysis of transactions
The remainder of this section will be organized as follows. The risk characteristics of each type of
capital vehicle will be analysed along with the types of derivatives that would likely be used in7
conjunction with that vehicle. Next, each of the relevant derivatives instruments will be briefly
described before joining the two discussions to show how the capital vehicles and derivatives
instruments are used together or as substitutes.
3.2.1 Foreign exchange forward
A foreign exchange forward is a contract in which counterparties agree to exchange specified
amounts of foreign currencies at some specified exchange rate on a specified future date. The
forward exchange rate is the price at which the counterparties will exchange currency on the
future expiration date. The forward rate is negotiated so that the present value of the forward
contract at the time it is traded is zero; this is referred to by describing the contract as trading
at par or ‘at the market’. As a result, no money need be paid at the commencement of the
contract, although the counterparties may agree to post collateral in order to insure each
other’s performance of the contract.
Table 4
Capital vehicle Risk exposure Derivative, or risk management
Bank loans*  
Investor Creditworthiness credit derivatives, cross-default clause or diversification
Developing country Interest rate interest rate swap
  Foreign exchange foreign exchange forward, swap or option
  Liquidity line of credit (embedded option)
Carry trade Foreign exchange TRS - total return swap
Bonds*
Major currency bond
Investor Interest rate interest rate swap or future
  Creditworthiness Diversification
  Price TRS
Developing country Foreign exchange foreign exchange forward, swap or option
Local currency bond
Investor Foreign exchange foreign exchange forward or swap




Investor Foreign exchange foreign exchange forward, swap or option
  Price TRS, equity futures and options
Developing country NA
FDI (non-securitized)
Investor Foreign exchange foreign exchange forward, swap or option
Developing country NA
*Bank loans are presumed to be denominated in a major currency (e.g. US$), at variable (floating) interest rates
and underwritten by a syndicate of banks. Bond refers to conventional notes and bonds, floating rate note, and
structured note.
Source: Author’s own analysis.8
3.2.2 Foreign exchange swap
A foreign exchange swap is simply the combination of a spot and forward transaction (or
possibly two forwards). The start leg of the swap usually consists of a spot foreign exchange
transaction at the current spot exchange rate, and the close leg consists of a second foreign
exchange transaction at the contracted forward rate. For example, a local investor enters a
foreign exchange swap of pesos against dollars in which it buys US$100,000 today at an
exchange rate of US$0.050 per peso (thus paying 2,000,000 pesos), and contracts to sell
US$100,000 (i.e. buy pesos) at US$0.0475 in 180 days. The local investor first receives
US$100,000 in the start leg, and then upon the swap expiration date pays US$100,000 in
exchange for receiving 2,105,263 pesos in the closing leg. This 10.8 per cent annual rate of
return in pesos is due to the depreciation of the peso against the dollar (or appreciation of the
dollar against the peso) and reflects the fact that the peso rate of return from investing in the
local currency is higher than the US dollar rate of return.
Foreign exchange forwards and swaps are used by both foreign and domestic investors to
hedge foreign exchange risk. Foreign investors from advanced capital markets who purchase
securities denominated in local currencies use foreign exchange forwards and swaps to hedge
their long local currency exposure. Similarly, foreign direct investments in physical real
estate, plant or equipment are exposed to the risk of local currency depreciation. Local
developing country investors who borrowed in major currencies in order to invest in local
currency assets are also exposed to foreign exchange risk, and they too use foreign exchange
forwards and swaps – as well as futures and options where available – to manage their risks.
Of course foreign exchange forwards and swaps were also used for speculation in these local
currencies. Derivatives enabled speculators to leverage their capital in order to take larger
positions in the value of local currencies. In turn, it meant developing country central banks
had to watch the exchange rate in two markets, the spot and forward, in order to maintain
their fixed exchange rates.
Forwards and foreign exchange swaps are not always highly collateralized (measured as a
percentage of the principal). Collateral is less likely to be used for trading between the major
market dealers, and collateral is lower for less volatile financial instruments such as foreign
currency.10 This enables foreign exchange derivatives users to obtain greater amounts of
currency exposure relative to capital, and therefore it can leave foreign exchange derivatives
counterparties exposed to greater credit risk. The largest source of credit losses in the
derivatives markets in recent years were due to defaults on foreign currency forwards in East
Asia and Russia (Swaps Monitor 1999).
3.2.3 Foreign exchange forwards and swaps – capital outflow problems
In addition to the above concerns about the potential dangers of foreign exchange derivatives,
there is the additional problem with reverse capital flows. This arises from the need of
derivatives dealers to create both long and short positions in developing country currencies in
order to make a market in derivatives.
                                                
10 Volatility is less in comparison to local currency securities whose risk is the product of both the foreign
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Every derivatives contract involves a short and a long position. The party buying pesos in
exchange for US dollars in the forward market is long pesos (and short dollars), while the
counterparty is short pesos. In the market for peso forwards and swaps there is likely to be
one or more dealers. A dealer makes a market by quoting bid and offer (ask)11 prices and
then standing behind them. Ideally, the dealer faces a market full of participants who are
willing to buy and sell in equal amounts. In this case the dealer reacts to investors hitting his
bid (i.e. selling pesos forward to the dealer) by trying to lay-off the long peso exposure by
selling pesos to other participants in the market (those who are lifting his offer). However, it
is likely that a dealer in developing country foreign exchange derivatives will often face a
one-sided or imbalanced market in which most participants want to be short the local
currency.12 This means that it is often difficult or expensive for dealers to lay-off their long
positions by selling short to others in the forward or other derivatives markets. As a result,
either the forward rate must rise (or fall) sufficiently to compensate the dealer and other risk
takers for holding greater amounts of the long positions, or the dealer must find other,
cheaper means to manage its risk.
One such alternative method used by dealers in the face of an imbalanced market is to create
a synthetic forward or swap contract through the use of the local credit markets. In order to
create a synthetic short forward peso position against the dollar, the dealer borrows in the
                                                
11 A bid is the price at which the dealer is willing to buy, and the ask or offer is the price at which the dealer is
willing to sell.
12 If investors seek to acquire mostly long local currency positions, then the derivatives dealer will do the
opposite and this will create instead a capital inflow.10
local peso credit market (thus creating a peso liability), uses the loan proceeds to buy dollars
spot and then invests the dollars (thus obtaining a dollar asset). Ideally, the maturity of the
forward, peso loan and dollar investment will match. The product of these three transactions
gives the dealer a specified amount of dollars in the futures (the loan repayment) that can be
sold for pesos at a specified exchange rate in settling the forward contract and the proceeds
from which will repay the peso debt and leave the dealer with a profit. In this manner the
dealer can continue to quote bid and offer prices without holding market risk.
Note that in the process of creating synthetic short forward position to make a market in
foreign exchange derivatives, the dealer has generated a capital outflow by borrowing at
home and lending abroad in the dollar market. Thus in the context of imbalanced markets,
where there are more participants willing to hold short rather than long positions at
reasonable rates, hedging can generate capital outflows. If a foreign investor trades a foreign
exchange forward or swap in order to hedge an investment in a local currency security or
direct investment, then the derivatives market will potentially generate a capital outflow
equal to the size of the hedge. If the foreign investor wishes to hedge the full value of the
invested principle, then the hedging process can potentially neutralize or net-out the capital
inflow. Of course, the flow is again reversed and returns to the developing country when the
dealer’s loan matures and he uses the dollar proceeds to unwind his synthetic forward
position.13
There is an additional concern with foreign exchange swaps and their affect on capital flows.
Note that the cash flows from such a swap resemble the cash flow from a short-term foreign
currency loan (see example above). Dollars are received today and are repaid in the future,
and the ‘loan’ cost is paid in pesos based on dollar interest rates as well as those in pesos. In
recognition of this, Malaysia prohibited foreign exchange swaps as part of its effort to impose
capital controls to impede capital inflows prior to the 1997 financial crisis.
3.2.4 Interest rate swap
The basic interest rate swap, called a vanilla interest rate swap, is an agreement between two
parties to exchange the net of two series of payments. One series of payments is based on a
fixed interest rate applied to a notional principal, such as 6 per cent on US$1 million, and the
other series of payments is based on a floating rate, such as 3-month LIBOR, applied to the
same notional principal. In order to simplify payments and other clearing issues, most swap
contracts allow the two parties to pay (or receive) only the net or the difference between these
two series on each payment or ‘drop’ date.
Borrowers with variable interest rate loans can hedge their interest rate risk with a swap in
which they receive the floating rate and pay the fixed rate (i.e. buy a swap) and thereby swap
their floating rate payments for fixed rate payments.
3.2.5 Total return swap
A total return swap (TRS) is a contract in which at least one series of payments is based on
the total rate of return (change in market price plus interest or dividend payments) on some
                                                
13 Similarly, the purchase of dollars in the spot market by the dealer is also ultimately reversed when he
purchases pesos in the settlement of the forward contract.11
underlying asset, security or security index. The other leg of the swap is typically based on a
variable interest rate such as LIBOR, but may be a fixed rate or the total rate of return on
some other financial instrument. Based upon what is known about the pre-crisis situations in
Mexico and East Asian, the total return swaps in those situations usually swapped LIBOR
against the total rate of return on a government security.
A total return swap replicates the position of borrowing at LIBOR in order to finance the
holding of a security. The returns are the same, but unlike the actual cash market transaction,
it does not involve ownership or debt. Instead, the only capital involved in a TRS is the
posting of collateral. In addition to the reduction in the need to commit capital to the
transaction, a TRS also has no impact on a firm’s balance sheet and is not likely to be subject
to regulatory restrictions on foreign exchange exposure.14 In short, TRS allow financial
institutions and investors to raise their risks, and potential returns, relative to capital.
One of the troublesome uses of total return swaps is to capture the gains from the carry trade
or carry business. A profitable carry trade exists where exchange rates are fixed and interest
rate differentials persist between the two economies. Then it is possible to borrow in the low
interest rate currency and lend in the high interest rate currency with no risk other than that of
a failure in the fixed exchange rate regime.
The use of TRS alters the form, but not necessarily the quantity, of capital flows to
developing countries. Alternatively, when developing country financial institutions engage in
the carry business, the capital flows are in the form of major currency (usually short-term)
bank loans. If they pursued the same profit opportunities by using TRS, then it would
generate indirect capital flows as swaps counterparties, usually swaps dealers from advanced
capital markets, bought the underlying asset as a hedge against their own position in the TRS.
Consider the dealer’s side of the transaction. The dealer contracts to receive LIBOR plus a
spread in exchange for paying the total return on a local currency security. The dealer does
not intend to profit by investing on the expectation that LIBOR will rise or that the total
return on the security will fall. Instead, the dealer lays-off the risk by borrowing at LIBOR
and using the proceeds to buy the local currency security. The dealer then passes-through in
the regular swap payment the proceeds from holding the local security while its cost from
borrowing to buy the security are covered by the LIBOR payments received from the
developing country swap counterparty. The spread above LIBOR paid to the dealer is the
dealer’s profit, and the dealer ends up holding no market risk.15
Note that in the process of hedging the dealer’s position in the TRS, there is a capital inflow
to the developing country because the advanced capital market dealer has purchased the local
currency security.
As a result, the capital would flow to developing countries through the purchase of local
currency denominated securities by swaps dealers instead of through a major currency bank
loan. Normally the flow of capital in the form of local currency securities would shift the
exchange rate risk to the advanced capital markets, but not in this case. Instead, it functions in
                                                
14 It would incur a capital charge only if it were to move into the money.
15 The dealer’s credit risk – the risk of the counterparty failing to perform on the contract – is mitigated through
the use of collateral.12
conjunction with the TRS to leave the local developing country investors holding the foreign
exchange risk (the short dollar position) much like a major currency bank loan.
On one hand, the use of TRS results in similar foreign exchange exposure as before. However
in some ways it is far worse. In comparison to using foreign bank loans to capture profit from
the carry trade, TRS cause even greater surges in foreign currency than with short-term bank
loans. The potential surge originates from the collateral requirements on the swap. If the
present value of the swap were to suddenly drop as a result of a rise in local interest rates, a
drop in the currency or both, then the local swap holder would be required to post (additional)
collateral with their swap counterparty. Generally this means selling other assets, often other
developing country assets, in order to obtain dollars in order to meet the requirements to post
additional collateral by the next day – if not intraday. In this way, TRS can result in large and
immediate major currency outflows in foreign currency transfers. If short-term bank loans are
considered hot money, then payments to meet margin and collateral requirements are
microwave money – they get hot more quickly.
As an indication of the potential magnitude of these collateral outflows, Garber and Lall (1996)
cite the IMF and ‘industry sources’ which reported that Mexican banks held US$16 billion in
tesobonos total return swaps at the time of the devaluation of the Mexican peso. The authors
calculated that the initial peso devaluation depressed the value of tesobonos by 15 per cent, and
that this would have required the delivery of US$2.4 billion in collateral the next day. This
would explain about half of the US$5 billion dollars of foreign reserves lost by the Mexican
central bank the day after devaluation. In this way, collateral or margin calls on derivatives can
accelerate the pace of a financial crisis, and the greater leverage that derivatives provide can also
multiply the size of the losses and thereby deepen the crisis.
The use of TRS also increases the likelihood of contagion. They often involve cross-currency
assets and payments and are therefore more likely to transfer disruptions from one market to
another. Neftci (1998) claims that one reason that Korean banks engaged in so many
Indonesian total return swaps was that they were seeking higher rates of return in response to
a rise in their funding costs. ‘But, note that at the end of this process, Korean banks are being
exposed to Indonesian credit. This however, is not visible on their balance sheets. This
situation not only creates the possibility for contagion, but may also make the contagion
unpredictable and severe’.
3.2.6 Structured notes
Structured notes, also known as hybrid instruments, are the combination of a credit market
instrument, such as a bond or note, with a derivative such as an option or futures-like
contract. Hybrid instruments include such conventional securities as convertible stocks,
convertible bonds and callable bonds. These have long been among the set of traditional
securities regularly issued and traded in US financial markets.
Structured notes were part of the new wave of innovation in capital flows to developing
countries in the 1990s. They offered issuers and investors either better yields than similarly
rated securities, or better combinations or bundles of risk characteristics. In some cases,
structured notes were designed to circumvent accounting rules or government regulations so
as to allow lower capital charges, greater foreign exchange exposure or greater overall risk to
capital.13
Table 6
Putable debt issued from East Asia
(US$ millions due in 1999 or 2000)
Loans Bonds








Data from the IMF (1999).
The structured notes used in developing countries were usually structured so that their yield
was linked to the value of one or more of the currencies or stock indices in the developing
economies. The issuers of these structured notes were financial institutions from advanced
capital market economies, and the investors were often developing country financial
institutions and investors who were more willing to hold their own exchange rate risk or that
of their neighboring developing countries.
3.2.7 Putable debt
The largest threat to financial market stability that did not directly involve foreign exchange
exposure was the use of embedded derivatives, called put options, in loan and bond debt
contracts. These put options on the debt principal enabled lenders to recall their principal in
the event of economic trouble. The effect was to drain the developing country financial
markets of liquidity just at the time it was most urgently in need.
In is not unusual for credit instruments to have attached options. Callable bonds are familiar
financial instruments in advanced capital markets. They are the combination of a
conventional bond and a call option that allows the issuer i.e. the borrower, to recall the
principal on the bond at a specified value (usually par) after some future date. Callable bonds
are used by borrowers to reduce the risk that they will be locked into higher than market rates
of interest on their outstanding debt.
In the case of developing country debt, the attached options were usually puts rather than
calls. This granted the lenders, not the borrowers, the right to reclaim their principal. Lenders
in advanced capital markets attached put provisions to loans and bonds in order to reduce
their risk of adverse macroeconomic conditions or other circumstances which would reduce
the ability of their borrowers to repay their debts. It also reduced their exposure to increases
in dollar or other hard currency interest rates. Yet another motivation involved outflanking14
tax and regulatory requirements because the putable loans could be treated like long-term
debts even though they potentially functioned like short-term ones.
These put options were in the form of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ puts. Hard puts, usually attached to a
note or bond, gave the lender the right to demand principal repayment after a certain date, e.g.
a five year note might be put-able after one year. Soft puts, usually attached to loans, gave
lenders the right to reschedule the terms of their credit in the event of certain adverse
‘events’. Table 6 shows the breakdown between loans and bonds in East Asia.
Most of the ‘hard’ put options were closer to the European rather than the American style
option. In these cases, option holders were granted the right to exercise the option only on
specific days or perhaps semiannually; in only a very few cases were the options exercisable
on a continuous basis like American options.
These attached put options facilitated lending by lowered costs to borrowers and by giving
lenders the assurance of obtaining some lending alternatives in the event of adverse market
disruptions.
This put-able debt instrument was used widely in the rapidly growing developing country
bond market. The IMF estimated in 1999, using available public databases, that there were
US$32 billion in debts putable through the end of 2000 for all emerging countries. Of the
total, US$23 billion is from East Asian issuers, and US$8 billion was from Brazil.
The presence of put-able debt in lending to developing economies raises several policy
concerns. First, the attached put lowers the borrowing costs and this in turn encourages more
borrowing and lending. Second, the tax and regulatory treatment of putable debt often
incorrectly treats it as long-term debt even though it functions like short-term debt. Third, it
creates liquidity shortages in the event of a financial disruption, and it does so just at the time
in which liquidity is crucial for the successful functioning of the financial sector. In sum, put-
able debt tends to increase indebtedness and does so in a manner that exacerbates financial
disruptions.
4 Threats to currency stability: Derivatives and fixed exchange rate regimes
The presence of derivatives markets poses a special set of challenges for a government
maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. This is true whether it is a soft peg, a crawling peg or
a hard peg.
Developing country governments pursue a fixed exchange rate policy in order to encourage
trade and investment by lowering exchange rate risk. A fixed exchange rate can promote growth
through the expansion of trade and foreign investment by making those economic decisions less
uncertain and more dependable. This reduces the costs of foreign exchange risk involved with
importing capital and raw material, exporting goods, and repaying foreign debts. Another reason
is to stop the acceleration of inflation, or lower the rate of inflation by anchoring to external
inflation.
Against this backdrop of a fixed exchange rate policy, the presence of exchange rate related
derivatives raises several important problems that are expressed in the following questions.15
i)  Of what use are foreign exchange forwards or swaps when the fixed exchange rate
regime eliminates normal market price volatility? In other words, how and why
would they be used since there is no market volatility to hedge?
ii)  What purpose does the price discovery of the forward rate (discount or premium)
serve, and what signals does it send?
iii)  How does it affect the ability of the central bank to maintain the fixed exchange
rate?
The first problem is that in the absence of normal market price fluctuations, exchange rate
derivatives function as a speculative or hedging instrument against the success of the
government’s policy. In a fixed exchange rate context, the only exchange rate movement that
investors need to hedge against is a failure of the fixed rate regime that results in either a
devaluation of the pegged exchange rate or a complete abandonment of the regime. There is a
much smaller risk of an appreciation of a developing country currency, and so the more
relevant risk is a decline in its value. Using a forward, swap or option to take a potentially
profitable position on the possible fall in the currency’s value is practically a one way bet.
The future exchange rate determined in a forward or swap derivative market is not an
expression of economic value but instead reflects the likelihood of government failure or a
measure of the lack of confidence in the government’s ability to maintain a fixed exchange
rate. In short, it is a political price or the price of a policy event.16
Derivatives markets also provide leverage to speculators and ‘players’ who might mount an
attack on the fixed exchange rate. This leverage in taking a position on the currency’s value,
whether using foreign exchange forwards, swaps or options, lowers the costs and therefore
raises the potential gain from such an undertaking. Derivatives provide lower cost price
exposure because of their higher leverage (which saves on costs of capital), higher levels of
liquidity (sometimes), and their lower transactions costs. Thus the presence of derivatives
markets is to empower those betting or plotting against the success of the government’s
macroeconomic policy.
Moreover, because it is a political price and a practically one way bet, there are likely to be
far more investors who want to be short – rather than long – the local currency. In order to
complete the market, foreign exchange derivatives dealers will have to engage in the activity
of creating synthetic short positions (described above) in order to lay-off their long-side risk.
The result of this is a capital outflow, and as the short-interest grows in the derivatives market
the capital outflow will increase and thus will contribute to the self-fulfilling speculation
against the currency.
The second problem is that in the presence of a fixed rate system, the forward and swap
market will create a market price, a process known as price discovery, that will reflect the
lack of confidence in the government’s exchange rate policy. That price will almost certainly
indicate that the future value of the currency will be below the present pegged spot rate. If
that price is misunderstood, then it will regularly send the signal that the currency is going to
move off of the peg.
                                                
16 This is not to say that there is no economic value to a political or policy event.16
The third problem concerns how the presence of forward and swap markets affect the central
bank’s ability to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime against moderate downward pressure
caused by some short-term imbalance or a large speculative attack.
If there is only a spot market for foreign currency, then the central bank can defend its
exchange rate peg by intervening directly in the spot market to buy its currency with foreign
reserves and by tightening domestic credit conditions. Direct intervention, although the
foreign currency market is large, can be effective because the central bank’s intervention is
both a large net purchase within that market and because it sends a signal. The later method
consists of either raising interest rates – which attracts foreign capital inflows, discourages
outflows and increase the cost of carrying synthetic short positions – or restricting the supply
of credit to certain borrowers such as foreigners or non-commercial firms.
The presence of one or more foreign exchange derivatives markets adds policy targets for the
central bank. Moreover, the derivatives markets are in some ways more problematic as
targets than the spot market. While the spot market is large, the potential size of the forward
and swap market is infinite. If the central bank raises local interest rates, then the interest rate
differential increases and serves as a larger basis for discounting the forward and swap rates.
If the central bank intervenes directly, perhaps in an effort to avoid the forward market
signaling a lack of confidence in the regime, then there is potentially no end to the effort. In
so far that the central bank intervention succeeds in supporting the forward or swap rate, it
offers attackers a better price at which to sell the local currency in the future. If the central
bank does not intervene, then the forward can continue to signal a devaluation and further
growth in open interest in the forward or swap market will spur capital outflows as
derivatives dealers construct synthetic short positions.
This is not to say that the situation becomes hopeless. In the face of a currency ‘attack,’ the
central bank can take the extra step imposing capital controls that prohibit banks from
delivering the local currency to foreign entities. This prevents foreign speculators from
delivering on their forward contracts. This measure, taken together with an increase in
interest rates, amounts to a bear squeeze. This strategy, as used in the case of Thailand in the
spring of 1997, is described in Lall (1997) and Garber and Lall (1996).
5 Policy solutions
The following policy proposals are a set of financial market regulations that are designed to
make financial markets more efficient and less susceptible to disruptions and distortions.17
They should encourage the use of derivatives for risk management purposes while
discouraging their use in unproductive pursuits that might create dangerous levels of
exposure to market risk, as well as credit risk, or lead to reverse capital flows.
These prudential regulatory proposals are fundamentally of two types. The first type relates to
reporting and registration requirements and is designed to improve the transparency – and
thus the pricing efficiency – in the markets. Reporting requirements also enable the
government, and other market surveillance authorities such as exchanges, to better detect and
                                                
17 These proposals were prepared as part of a presentation by the author to the North-South Institute in October
of 2001.17
deter fraud and manipulation. Registration requirements are especially useful in preventing
fraud.
The second type of prudential regulatory measures involves capital and collateral (also
known as margin) requirements. Capital requirements function to provide both a  buffer
against the vicissitudes of the market and a governor on the tendency of market competition
to drive participants towards seeking high returns and thus higher risks.18 Collateral
requirements have basically the same effect, although collateral requirements apply to
transactions in particular and not institutions. Thus non-financial institutions that would not
otherwise be subject to capital requirements would be subject to collateral requirements on
their derivatives transactions.
Moreover, the current market practice for managing collateral, in so far there is one, is
dangerous. It requires a firm to become ‘super-margined’ if its credit rating drops
substantially (especially if it drops below investment grade). This requires a derivatives
counterparty to post substantial amounts of additional collateral, and amounts to a large
demand for fresh capital just at the time the firm is experiencing problems with inadequate
capital. This market practice creates a crisis accelerator. 
The following list of proposals is broken down into two groups. The first apply to financial
institutions and markets in industrialized or developed countries. Developing country
financial markets are not isolated from their counterparts in the advanced capital markets of
developed countries, and this interconnectedness – especially through derivatives markets – is
very important. As one senior IMF official remarked to me in private, ‘I have never seen one
sin in developing country financial markets that did not have as its counterparty someone
from New York or London’.
The second set includes all the elements of the first plus some additional provisions designed
to apply to financial institutions and markets in developed countries. One merit to identifying
useful regulatory improvements is that each developing country can adopt these prudential
regulations on its own initiative. Another merit is that most of these regulations are the same
or similar to ones used in industrialized countries and therefore should not be viewed as
objectionable by IMF or other actors in international capital markets.
Developed countries – registration, reporting, transparency and liquidity
1 Reporting and registration requirements
(a) Require participants (counterparties) in derivatives contracts to report their transactions to
the designated regulatory authority.
All  exchange traded derivatives are already reported to the exchange and its clearing
house. The exchange house collects this information and either reports it to the regulator
or keeps the records so that they can be called for in the future. Most OTC derivatives
transactions are traded through the ISDA Master Trading Agreement (‘Master
Agreement’) which requires that the counterparties to the derivatives trades exchange
                                                
18 John Eatwell has raised some serious concerns about the ability of capital held to meet capital requirements
to successfully function as a buffer against such changes. See Eatwell (2001).18
confirmation messages to insure that all the key terms are understood. The reporting
requirement would entail them to CC the email message or fax to the regulatory authority.
(b) Require derivatives dealers to report their derivatives transactions to the designated
regulatory authority. This data should include price, volume, open interest, put-call
volume and ratios, maturity, instrument, underlying item, amounts traded between other
dealers and with end-users, and collateral arrangements.
This information would to compiled, and the non-proprietary data would be made
available to the overall market so as to improve transparency. Once aggregated, this data
would reflect the character of the market while protecting the details of dealers’ market
positions (assuming there are several dealers). The data of a proprietary nature would be
retained by the regulator in order to detect and deter fraud, manipulation and potential
systemic breaks in the markets.
(c) Require publicly traded corporations to include an explicit statement of their derivatives
activities. Update financial reporting rules to require that financial reports convey the
actual, underlying economic properties and business purposes of minority interests,
special purpose entities and derivatives transactions as part of their regular financial
reporting statements.
In order to bring off-balance sheet activities into the same light as balance sheets,
derivatives would be reported by notional value (long and short), maturity, instrument and
collateral arrangements. This would enable investors to better determine whether the firm
was under- or over-hedged, and whether they were primarily acting as a producer or
wholesaler.
(d) Register all derivatives dealers and brokers.
In the US, banks, thrift and other depository institutions, securities brokers, securities
dealers, futures and options brokers and insurance salespersons are required to register
with their relevant regulatory authority. This establishes a minimum competence level for
the individuals, background checks to detect fraud and theft convictions for salespeople
and proper business organization for the institutions. Even though OTC derivatives
markets are generally dealer markets, the regulations should also apply to brokers. Some
electronic derivatives trading platforms function like brokers, and unforeseeable changes
in the markets may again elevate the role of brokers.
(e) Modernize accounting rules and other financial market regulations in order to properly
account for embedded derivatives.
There is a large and growing amount of securities and loans to which derivatives have
been attached or embedded. This has fundamentally altered the effectiveness of existing
rules for taking capital charges against the risks associated with holding or issuing these
securities, for financial reports regarding investments in these securities and even
regulations that might otherwise prohibit certain financial institutions, such as pension
funds or insurance companies, from investing in these securities. Modernized rules should
reflect the market risk associated with the attached or embedded derivative and not
merely the credit risk of the principle of the security.
2 Liquidity requirements
(a) In order to assure market liquidity, require OTC derivatives dealers to act as market
makers and maintain bid-ask quotes throughout the trading day.19
(b) Dealers benefit from the privilege of their role in the market. In addition to earning their
bid/ask spread, dealers are also privy to the most current changes in the market. Along
with this privilege should come the responsibility to help maintain liquidity and an
orderly market. US stock exchanges, such as the NYSE and NASDQ, already require that
‘specialists’ act as dealers or market makers throughout the trading day. In the OTC cash
market for US Treasury securities, the primary dealers are also required to act as market
makers throughout the trading day. Those markets have proven to some of the most
efficient and most liquid in the world, and so this supporting market rule has proven its
merit.
3 Anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority
(a) Strictly prohibit fraud on the market and the manipulation of market prices and make it
punishable by civil and criminal penalties.
In order to protect the integrity of market prices so that they encourage the widest
possible market participation and do not signal distorting signals throughout the economy,
fraud and manipulation should be strictly prohibited and punishable by civil and criminal
penalties.
(b) Requirement reports of large trader positions.
Derivatives dealers and exchanges would have to report each entity that amasses a certain
size of position in the market. This information would be compiled across markets in
order to detect and deter market manipulation. This large trader reporting data has proven
very useful by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the US for the purpose of
market surveillance.
(c) Extend ‘know thy customer’ rules to all financial institutions conducting lending,
underwriting, repurchase agreement transactions, securities lending transactions, and all
derivatives transactions with entities in developing countries.
This provision will discourage financial sharpsters from ‘blowing-up’ their customers.
For example, the PERLs served no positive purpose for East Asian investors and were
primarily a stealth vehicle for financial institutions in developed countries to acquire
long-dated short positions in developing country currencies.19 This provision also exists
in US securities markets and a comparable measure exists for US banking markets. It
should be extended to derivatives markets where there is even greater concern with the
large differences between market participants in the degree of financial sophistication.
Developed countries – capital and collateral requirements
4 Capital requirements
(a) Update capital requirements for all financial institutions, including derivatives dealers
that might not otherwise be registered as a financial institution, so that the capital is held
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in an amount that is commensurate with not only the exposure to credit loss, but also
potential future exposure and value at risk (VAR).
These provisions are beginning to be applied in some spheres of developed countries,
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US which has adopted these rules
for derivatives dealers registered under rules known as ‘Broker-Dealer Lite.’
Capital serves two functions: first, it acts as a buffer when the firm suffers from an
adverse event; and second, it limits to amount of a firm’s risk taking in so far that the
capital requirement is appropriately structured to be proportional to risk exposure. Capital
requirements are critical to prevent the problems at one firm from becoming problems at
other firms. This is especially important for dealers in financial markets because their
failure can lead to market problems such as illiquidity (market freeze-up) or meltdown.
5 Collateral requirements
(a) Require adequate and appropriate collateral or margin to be posted and maintained on all
derivatives transactions.20
Collateral (margin) on transactions functions like capital does for financial institutions. It
helps prevent the problems at one firm or with one transaction from causing performance
problem for other transactions and other firms. In doing so it reduces the likelihood of
default or other credit related losses, and it reducing the market’s vulnerability to a
freeze-up or meltdown. The current market practice for the use of collateral, in so far
there is one, is inadequate.
One particularly dangerous market practice is to require small initial collateral levels, but
then requires a firm to become ‘super-margined’ if its credit rating drops. This initiates a
large increase in the need for collateral just at the time the firm is experiencing problems
with inadequate capital. This amounts to a crisis accelerator.
Developing countries – registration, reporting, transparency and liquidity
6 Additional registration and reporting requirements
(a) Reporting and registration requirements for derivatives dealers and derivatives
participants in developing countries should be the same those in developed countries.
The need to prevent fraud and maintain a transparent market environment are no less
important for developing economies. The need to maintain these requirements is thus just
as great. The cost of administering and enforcing these requirements is not substantial.
(b) The ability to enforce reporting requirements can be enhanced by stipulating that any
derivatives transaction that is not reported cannot be actionable in court for legal
enforceability or bankruptcy claims. This provision will lead derivatives counterparties to
thoroughly comply with reporting requirements in order to protect their interests in the
contracts. Otherwise it amount to giving a counterparty an option to legally abrogate the
obligations of the contract.
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Developing countries – capital and collateral requirements
7 Capital requirements, in addition to those for developed countries listed in
section 4
(a) Limit exposure to foreign exchange rate, interest rate and other market price fluctuations
to a percentage of capital.
The limitations can be figured as percent of capital and can be augmented by an absolute
limit. The limitation should apply to a consolidated balance sheet and off-balance sheet
measure of exposure. The limits can be made tighter for higher degrees of exchange rate
management.
Examples of position or exposure limits already exist on US derivatives exchanges. These
restrictions amount to explicit limitations on risk taking, but not hedging. This measure
can be very effective in limiting the amount of carry trade or ‘hot money’ related
transactions because they result in exchange rate exposure and sometimes interest rate
exposure. In doing so, it will disencourage leveraged exposure to devaluation or
depreciation, and encourage long-term or more diversified investment.
(b) Limit the mismatch in maturity on assets and liabilities
Another source of financial vulnerability that can plague developing countries more than
their wealthier, developed neighbors is the risk associated with mismatching the maturity
of assets and liabilities. Not only is there an interest rate risk from changes in the level
and slope of the yield curve, but moreover there is the liquidity or refunding risk from not
being able to continue rolling-over or renewing loans.
8 Collateral requirements
(a) Collateral requirements for derivatives dealers and other derivatives participants in
developing countries should be the same those in developed countries.
Collateral requirements are no less important for financial markets in developing
economies. The appropriate level of collateral should be sufficiently high to establish safe
and sound foundation for market transactions, and yet not so high that the use of risk
management tools is discouraged by their lack of affordability.
Developing countries do have additional reasons to maintain relatively stronger collateral
requirements. They have the need to establish a reputation for market safety and
soundness. In so far that they suffer more than wealthy countries when financial sector
disruptions occur, they have the reason to require a greater ‘buffer’ against such
uncertainties. In addition, by raising the cost of risk taking, relatively higher collateral
standards will serve to discourage excessive risk taking.
The above regulations apply to both developed and developing countries – thus sharing the
responsibility to make changes. Note also how the burden sharing applies not just to debt
forgiveness or debt work-outs, but also to the sharing of risks. This follows from the basic
insight that developed countries have had more years of experience in regulating their
financial markets, and the beneficial wisdom of this experience should be shared. It is not
merely a one-way relationship, because it will also be held up as a mirror to developed
countries when they push for changes in developing countries that are inconsistent with what
is actually practiced at home. After all, US financial markets – with the exception of the OTC
derivatives markets – are closely regulated and so the ‘Washington Consensus’ towards a22
liberalized, free-market approach to developing country  finance markets amounts to
advocating ‘do as we say, not as we do’. This approach holds both sides accountable in their
own way.
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